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MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp.: Ignoring the
Basic Premise that 101 Must Come Before 102 and
103

In MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., the United States Federal Circuit (“Federal
Circuit”) considered whether summary judgment of the invalidity of patents-in-suit
was appropriate.1 The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment and noted
that the district court correctly decided the case under §§ 102 and 103 of the Patent
Act,2 as opposed to under § 101, as argued by the dissent.3 In deciding to bypass the
§ 101 subject matter eligibility analysis,4 the court incorrectly ignored several
decades of United States Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”) and Federal Circuit
precedent.5 This decision will lead to increased confusion in the area of § 101
jurisprudence—an already extremely unclear and convoluted area of law.6 As a
result of MySpace, Supreme Court intervention will eventually be necessary to
clarify whether § 101 is a preliminary question or if a judge can avoid it in the
exercise of discretion.7

® 2014 Emmanuel A. Fishelman
*
J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. I would like to thank
Paul Farmer, TJ Bolek, Adam Spiers, and all the editors who lent their time and energy to improving this Note.
I also thank Professors Michelle Harner and James Grimmelmann for their support of the Journal of Business &
Technology Law. I send a special thank you to Lisa M. Piccinini for her continued support and motivation.
Lastly, I would like to thank my family and loving parents, Norman and Luz Fishelman, for their unconditional
love and support throughout the years.
1. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
2. Id. at 1253.
3. Id. at 1264 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 1262.
5. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
6. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
7. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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I. THE CASE
MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp. was a patent8 infringement case that involved
four different patents.9 Each of these four patents claimed priority to a parent
application, filed on December 14, 1995.10 The four patents disclosed a method that
allowed users to “create, modify, and/or search” for database records over a
computer network.11
The litigation began when MySpace, Inc. and Craigslist, Inc. (collectively
referred to as “MySpace”) individually filed declaratory judgment suits against
GraphOn Corporation (“GraphOn”) in the Northern District of California.12
MySpace alleged that they did not infringe the four patents-in-suit because the
patents were invalid and because an existing patent, called the Mother of All
Bulletin Boards (“MBB”),13 basically provided the same functions as those functions
asserted in the patents.14 In stressing that the MBB invalidated the asserted patents
under any reasonable construction of the term “database,”15 MySpace argued that
the patents were invalid as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (“§ 102”) and obvious
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (“§ 103”).16 GraphOn denied these allegations and argued
that construction of the term “database” was necessary for MySpace’s invalidity

8. Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/inventors/patents.jsp#heading-1 (last
modified July 31, 2013). A patent is “a property right granted by the Government of the United States of
America to an inventor to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States for a limited time in exchange
for public disclosure of the invention when the patent is granted.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
9. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1254. The four patents at issue were U.S. Patent Nos. 6,324,538 (“538 Patent”),
6,850,940 (“940 Patent”), 7,028,034 (“034 Patent”), and 7,269,591 (“591 Patent”). Id.
10. Id. at 1254.
11. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 756 F.Supp.2d 1218, 1223 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 672 F.3d 1250
(Fed. Cir. 2012). A prime example of such a computer network is the internet. Id.
12. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1253. Fox Audience Network (“FOX”) is also included in “MySpace.” Id. The
MySpace and Craigslist cases were consolidated in May 2010. Id. at 1254.
13. MySpace, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 1224. The MBB was created by Dr. Oliver McBryan at the University of
Colorado, between Fall 1993 and February 1994. Id. The MBB “provid[ed] the ability to have online Internet
catalogues . . . which could grow without any intervention from a webmaster.” It also allowed users to create
entries that others could access, while the webmaster retained control, and it stored all of its files in a
hierarchical file system. Id.
14. Id. at 1222.
15. Id. at 1225. The three different models of database structures, in use prior to the suit, were:
hierarchical, relational, and network. Id. at 1222. A hierarchical database “uses a tree structure, which
resembles a parent-child relationship in which one parent can have many children, but a child can only have
one parent.” Id. A network database “uses a modified tree structure that allows for a node to be pointed to by
more than one parent.” Id. at 1223. A relational database “uses a table structure which is designed to manage
and organize large amounts of related data.” Id. At the time of the patents-in-suit, the relational database was
the most powerful and flexible of all the databases. Id.
16. Id. at 1222.
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argument because “database” was present in all four patents-in-suit.17 On May 26,
2010, MySpace filed a summary judgment motion on this issue of patent
invalidity.18
The primary issue the district court faced was whether a database consists solely
of a relational database or whether a database can also encompass a hierarchical
database, such as a file system.19 If “database” was defined to include both relational
and hierarchical systems, then GraphOn’s patents, which described a hierarchical
system, would be invalid as anticipated under § 10220 or obvious under § 103,21
because of the MBB.22 However, if “database” was defined to only consist of a
relational system, then it would be unclear whether the MBB invalidates the
patents-in-suit, and as a result, summary judgment would be inappropriate as there
would be a genuine issue of disputed fact regarding the invalidity.23 The district
court did not address the subject matter eligibility requirements laid out in 35
U.S.C. § 101 (“§101”)24 in its analysis.
In its analysis of the parties’ claims, the district court began by evaluating the
claim language for its “ordinary and customary meaning.”25 The court noted that
the term “relational” was not found anywhere in the patent claims or specification.26
GraphOn’s proposed construction27 would, therefore, impose limitations that are
not present in the claims.28 Next, the court turned to the specification and noted
that the specification encompassed several types of databases, as opposed to a solely
relational database.29 The court also noted that the specification contained other
language that weighed against GraphOn’s narrow definition of “database.”30
Therefore, the court concluded that the specifications supported a broader
17.

Id. at 1225.
Id. at 1222.
19. Id. at 1227.
20. See discussion infra Part II.B.
21. See discussion infra Part II.B.
22. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
23. Id.
24. See discussion infra Part II.B.
25. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 756 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1225 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 672 F.3d 1250
(Fed. Cir. 2012). The ordinary and customary meaning is understood to be “the meaning that the term would
have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. (quoting Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed Cir. 2005)).
26. MySpace, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 1227. The Court explained that the fact that “relational” was not found in
the patent claims or specifications supported MySpace’s argument that “database” is not limited to a relational
system. Id.
27. Id. GraphOn defined database narrowly as a relational database. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The Court inferred that the language in the specification indicated that various types of databases
were intended by the term “database.” Id. at 1228.
30. Id. at 1228.
18.
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construction of “database” than solely relational systems.31 Lastly, the court
considered the extrinsic evidence proffered in the case and noted that the expert
testimony supported MySpace’s construction of “database” and “reinforced the
appropriateness of a broader definition of database.”32
Using these steps, the district court construed “database” as “a collection of data
with a given structure that can be stored and retrieved” and granted MySpace’s
Motion for Summary Judgment.33 GraphOn filed a timely appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.34

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The issue of whether the subject matter eligibility requirements of § 101 must be
addressed before the §§ 102 and 103 issues of anticipation and obviousness are
analyzed has been addressed in several patent infringement cases heard by the
Federal Circuit35 and Supreme Court.36 This precedent clearly states that § 101 must
be addressed at the onset of a patent invalidity analysis, prior to the analysis of §§
102 or 103.37
A) Brief History and Overview of the Federal Circuit
In order to understand the Federal Circuit’s role in patent infringement cases, it
is helpful to briefly review its history and jurisdiction. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982.38 The Federal Circuit consists
of a merger between the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and
the United States Court of Claims.39 The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals in all patent cases and its precedent is binding on those cases.40 Only
the Supreme Court of the United States has the authority to overturn a decision of

31.
32.

Id. at 1229.
Id. at 1230–31. The experts included the inventor of the ‘538 patent and the founder of the MBB. Id.

at 1234.
33. Id. at 1232, 1243. In adopting MySpace’s definition of “database,” the Court declined to restrict
“database” to solely relational system, as set forth by GraphOn. Id. At 1232. This invalidated the patents-in-suit
as anticipated under § 102 or obvious under § 103. Id. at 1243.
34. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
35. See discussion infra Part II.B.
36. See discussion infra Part II.C.
37. See discussion infra Part II.B–C.
38. Court Jurisdiction, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/thecourt/court-jurisdiction.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
39. Id. As a result, all cases formerly heard by the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are
now heard by the Federal Circuit.
40. Id. This distinction is what makes decisions of the Federal Circuit different from decisions of other
circuits.
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the Federal Circuit.41 Otherwise, the decisions of the Federal Circuit are binding
throughout the United States if they are within the bounds of the court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction.42
B) Title 35 of the United States Code: The Patent Act
Similar to the importance of understanding the Federal Circuit, knowledge of
Title 35 of the United States Code, otherwise known as the “Patent Act,” is vital to
understanding patent law.43 In the United States, all aspects of patent law are
governed by the Patent Act.44 Under the Patent Act, there are four basic
requirements that an invention must meet in order to be patent-eligible.45 The first
requirement of patentability, found in §101, is that the invention must concern
patentable subject matter.46 Under § 102, the application for a patent on the
invention must be unanticipated and the invention must be timely.47 Under § 103,
the invention also must not be obvious.48 Lastly, under § 112, there must be a
sufficient amount of documentation for the invention.49
Section 101 of the Patent Act introduces the basic categories of patent eligible
subject matter, otherwise known as the “subject matter eligibility requirement.”50
The text of § 101 states: “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.”51 In general, § 101 is very broad and most inventions will
fall under its purview.52 However, the Supreme Court has restricted the reach of §
41.

Id.
Id.
43. See Mary Bellis, Patent Law: Understanding what patent law is and how it effects an inventor,
http://inventors.about.com/od/patentattorneys/a/patent_law.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) (noting that
current patent law is outlined by the U.S. Patent Act, Title 35 U.S.C.).
44. Jeffrey I. Auerbach, Patent Law Principles & Strategies, (Oct. 2006),
http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08-732/Patents/PatentLawPrinciples.pdf (“Title 35 of the United States
Code contains the statutory provisions affecting the grant of a United States patent.”).
45. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (2006). An invention must meet the requirements of §§ 101, 102, 103,
and 112. Id.
46. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
47. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
48. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
49. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
50. Daniel McKenzie, Patent Law 101: What’s Wrong and Ways to Make it Right, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 8,
2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/04/08/patent-law-101-whats-wrong-and-ways-to-make-it-right/ (describing
the categories eligible to be patented).
51. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
52. See Charles R. Bruzga, A Review of the Benson-Flook-Diehr Trilogy: Can the “Subject Matter” Validity of
Patent Claims Reciting Mathematical Formulae Be Determined Under 35 U.S.C. Section 112?, 69 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 197, 197–98 (1987).
42.
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101 through the creation of three judicial exceptions of what is deemed to not
constitute eligible subject matter.53 These three judicial exceptions include all “laws
of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”54 Three cases, known as the
“Big Three,” have provided guidelines and standards regarding the laws of nature
and physical phenomena.55 However, the meaning of abstract ideas is far more
ambiguous,56 and courts have had a very difficult time explaining what that term
means or what it may encompass.57
The next section of the Patent Act, § 102, is based on the concept of novelty.58
The section describes circumstances when a patent cannot be granted to an
inventor because the invention is already known publically, or it is no longer
“novel.”59 The § 102 subsections describe different types of prior art that can be
used as evidence to establish that an invention is already public.60 If an invention
qualifies as prior art, a patent on the subsequent invention is invalid.61
Finally, § 10362 of the Patent Act is based on the concept of obviousness.63 This
section provides that the invention must not have been obvious “to a person having
ordinary skill in the art.”64 In determining obviousness, neither the motivation nor
the purpose of the patentee is controlling.65 Rather, if the claim extends to what is
obvious, it is invalid and un-patentable under § 103.66 A way to prove obviousness
is to inquire whether, if at the time of invention, there was a known problem “for

53.

See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303 (1980).
Id. at 309.
55. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 173, 185 (1980); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 598 (1978); Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 64, 67 (1972).
56. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3236 (2010).
57. See Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (noting that defining
“abstractness” has presented difficult problems, in the realm of § 101).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
59. Id.
60. Id. This includes inventions that have already been described in existing patent applications and
inventions that have been on sale for over a year prior to the filing of the patent application. Id.
61. Id.
62. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
63. Id. at (a). “A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described
as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived
by the manner in which the invention was made.”
64. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (noting that § 103 of the Patent Act forbids
issuance of a patent when “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art”).
65. Id. at 397.
66. Id. at 407.
54.
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which there was an obvious solution encompassed by the patent’s claims.”67 In such
a situation, patenting is inappropriate due to the element of obviousness.
C) Supreme Court Precedent States That § 101 Is a Prerequisite That Must Be
Addressed Before §§ 102 and 103 Can Be Analyzed In Patent Infringement Cases
In construing the Patent Act, the Supreme Court has decided many cases which
have stated, both explicitly and implicitly, that the subject matter eligibility
requirements contained in § 101 must be addressed before a court can analyze the
other sections of the Patent Act.68 For the past 35 years, the Supreme Court has
consistently affirmed and reaffirmed the importance of addressing § 101 at the
onset of a patent invalidity challenge, before any consideration of §§ 102 and 103
should take place.69 Though courts have held that § 101 must come first, its
ambiguity and lack of concreteness has made other sections of the Patent Act, such
as §§ 102 and 103, more appealing to judges in patent litigation.70
In 1978, the Court decided Parker v. Flook, its first major opinion that
introduced the idea that § 101 must be addressed before any other section of the
Patent Act, in patent invalidity challenges.71 In Flook, a patent application would
have hypothetically met the §§ 102 and 103 requirements of novelty and nonobviousness.72 However, the Supreme Court rejected the application and did not
analyze the §§ 102 and 103 requirements because the patent application did not
meet the requirements of § 101—specifically, because the claimed process,
considered as a whole, contained no patentable invention.73 The Court prominently
emphasized that “the obligation to determine [whether an invention] falls within
the ambit of section 101 ‘must precede the determination of whether that
[invention] is, in fact, new or obvious.’”74 This language in Flook marshaled in the

67.

Id. at 419–20.
See e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998) abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
69. Flook, 437 U.S. at 584. Decided in 1978, Flook was the first case to address the importance of
addressing § 101 prior to any other statutory provision in the patent act. Id.
70. See Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land:
Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to its Technology Mooring, 63
STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1289 (2011) (noting the “lack of a forthright, principled framework for delineating the
boundaries of patentable subject matter”).
71. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). Two years earlier in Dann v. Johnston, the Supreme Court held
that the patents-in-suit were unpatentable as obvious, under § 103. 425 U.S. 219, 220 (1976). However, the
Court did not explicitly state that § 101 must come first. Id.
72. Flook, 437 U.S. at 600.
73. Id. at 595 n. 18. (noting that “a claim for an improved method of calculation, even when tied to a
specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter under § 101”).
74. Id. at 593.
68.

Vol. 9 No. 1 2014

113

FISHELMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

1/28/2014 2:09 PM

MySpace Inc. v. GraphOn Corp.
beginning of judicial interpretation of the Patent Act requiring § 101 interpretation
as a preliminary test.
Two years after Flook, the Supreme Court elaborated on the wide scope of § 101
and discussed the importance of its consideration.75 In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the
Supreme Court inquired into Congress’s intent and noted that, in drafting § 101,
Congress intended for it to include “anything under the sun that is made by man.”76
The Supreme Court accordingly adopted the idea of broad patentability.77 Then, in
1981, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Flook in its decision in Diamond v. Diehr,
where it expressly stated that the question of whether a particular invention meets
the §§ 102 or 103 requirements does not affect the determination of whether it
meets § 101’s subject matter eligibility requirement.78 In noting that a § 101 analysis
is “wholly apart” from a § 102 or § 103 analysis, the Supreme Court provided
important precedent that it and the Federal Circuit would use for the next three
decades.79
The Court’s view on the vital role that § 101 plays and its interpretation that §
101 must always be analyzed first in patent cases was reaffirmed in 2010.80 In Bilski
v. Kappos, the Court called the § 101 subject matter eligibility inquiry a “threshold
test,” and specified that a claimed invention must not only satisfy § 101, but must
also satisfy the conditions and requirements of §§ 102, 103, and 112 in order to
receive the protection of the Patent Act.81 The importance of Bilski and whether it
provided significant contributions to patent law have been debated by legal
scholars. Some scholars argue that Bilski was the most important Supreme Court
decision that contributes to § 101 jurisprudence and that it had “the makings of a
landmark decision.”82 However, other scholars disagree that Bilski was a major
piece of § 101 jurisprudence, noting that Bilski did not provide any insight into
what § 101 requires, and it specifically left out a test for assessing whether

75.

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
Id. at 309; see also Ricardo Bonilla, A Patented Lie: Analyzing the Worthiness of Business Method Patents
After Bilski v. Kappos, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1285, 1298 (2011).
77. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and Industry Norms, 2009 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 875, 880 (2009) (noting that the legislative history of the Patent Act is often quoted by proponents of
broad patentability).
78. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 176 (1981) (indicating that “[t]he questions of whether a particular
invention meets the ‘novelty’ requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 102 or the ‘nonobviousness’ requirements of § 103 do
not affect the determination of whether the invention falls into a category of subject matter that is eligible for
patent protection under § 101”).
79. Id. at 190 (“[T]he question therefore of whether a particular invention is novel is ‘wholly apart’ from
whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter”).
80. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
81. Id. at 3225.
82. See Ebby Abraham, Bilski v. Kappos: Sideline Analysis from the First Inning of Play, 26 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 15, 15 (2011).
76.
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something is an abstract idea.83 Though Bilski did not provide courts with precise
guidance on how to conduct a § 101 analysis, it certainly reaffirmed the Supreme
Court’s position that § 101 is a “threshold test,” necessary in the beginning of a
patent analysis.84 Although several Supreme Court cases analyzing § 101 have been
decided since Bilski, none of these cases have directly conflicted with Bilski’s express
indication that § 101 must be addressed first. Therefore, prior to 2012, Bilski
remained unchallenged precedent.85
D) Federal Circuit Precedent Has Followed the Supreme Court in Holding That § 101
is a Prerequisite That Must Be Addressed First In Patent Infringement Cases
Similar to the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit and its predecessors have held
that the § 101 inquiry must come before an invention is screened through the §§
102 or 103 requirements. Several decades of opinions, including some prior to the
creation of the Federal Circuit, have noted the importance of addressing the § 101
subject matter eligibility requirements before proceeding to the other sections of the
Patent Act.
In 1979, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals provided
insight regarding how inventions “on the difficult path to patentability” must be
analyzed.86 Using the analogy of opening doors, the court stated that the first door
that must be opened by an inventor on the path to patentability is § 101.87 Only if
the invention falls into any of the named categories described in § 101,88 the court
noted, may it pass through the second door of § 102, which has a “novelty and loss
of right to patent” sign on it.”89 Ten years later, the Federal Circuit revisited Bergy’s
“first door” concept in St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., where it
noted that the “first door which must be opened on the difficult path to
patentability is § 101.”90 The St. Bank & Trust Co. court also stated that any
invention which passes the § 101 subject matter eligibility requirements may be
patented, provided that it meets the other patentability requirements found in §§

83. See Jad Mills, Patentable Subject Matter in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 377, 390 (2011).
84. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.
85. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012)
(declining to substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the better established inquiry under § 101).
86. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) vacated in part, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S.
1028 (1980).
87. Id. The court stated that simply having an invention will not automatically open this first door. Id.
88. Id. The court noted that § 112 must be analyzed in providing a definition in the patent claims for an
invention. Id.
89. Id. Notably, the language in the opinion did not mention § 103. Id.
90. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 n. 2 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(quoting Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 at 960), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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102, 103, and 112.91 Again, this decision shows a preference by the courts to require
§ 101 analysis before anything else.
The Federal Circuit was quiet on the issue of § 101 as a preliminary question
until it decided Comiskey, over a decade later in 2009.92 In In re Comiskey, the
Federal Circuit stated that whether an invention meets the § 101 subject matter
eligibility requirements is an “antecedent question” that must be addressed before
the § 103 issue of non-obviousness can be addressed.93 Until that time, this was the
Federal Circuit’s most explicit articulation that § 101 must be analyzed first.
Comiskey spurred a rejuvenation of § 101 litigation in the Federal Circuit where,
over the next three years, the “antecedent question” concept from Comiskey was
revisited and affirmed by several decisions.
One such affirmation occurred in Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., where the Federal Circuit affirmed the Bilski standard that the § 101 inquiry
is a “threshold test.”94 In discussing the Patent Act, the court referred to § 101 as a
“coarse eligibility filter.”95 The following year, in Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC,
the court reaffirmed the “coarse eligibility filter” concept and also clarified the
scope of § 101 by indicating that it should not be used to invalidate patents “[based
on] concerns about vagueness, indefinite disclosure, [and] lack of enablement.”96
Rather, the court indicated that other patent requirements should be used to weed
out undeserving inventions, after they have passed the coarse eligibility filter.97
In 2012, the Federal Circuit decided Dealertrach, Inc. v. Huber98—the most recent
relevant decision before MySpace. In Dealertrack, the court followed precedent and
granted summary judgment because the patents-in-suit were ineligible subject

91. See Id. at 1372 (noting that “[t]he plain and unambiguous meaning of § 101 is that any invention
falling within one of the four stated categories of statutory subject matter may be patented, provided it meets
the other requirements for patentability set forth in Title 35, i.e., those found in §§ 102, 103, and 112”).
92. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
93. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 975. The court rejected the applicant’s argument that his application was
“patentable under § 101, and that the subject matter of his application did not fall within an exception to
patentability, such as an abstract idea, natural phenomena, or law of nature.” Id. at 972-73.
94. Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
95. Id. at 869. It also bears noting that the court affirmed the importance of §§ 102 and 103 by stating that
§ 101 eligibility should not become a substitute for the other requirements of the Patent Act. Id. at 868 (noting
that the Supreme Court has advised that §101 eligibility should not become a substitute for a patentability
analysis related to prior art, adequate disclosure, or the other conditions and requirements of Title 35); see also
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No. 11-1078,
2013 WL 141405 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2013) (emphasizing the differences between the threshold inquiry of patenteligibility, and the substantive conditions of patentability”).
96. See Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The court also explained
that although expansive, the § 101 requirements are not substitutes for the substantive patentability
requirements set out in §§ 102, 103, and 112. Id. at 1341.
97. Id. at 1354.
98. 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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matter under the preliminary § 101 inquiry.99 Although the court did not create
new § 101 precedent, this case is the most recent example of the Federal Circuit
following its earlier precedent—that a patent whose validity is challenged must first
be evaluated under § 101 before a §§ 102 or 103 analysis may be undertaken under
the Patent Act. Notably, the dissent in Dealertrack argued that courts should
exercise their judicial authority by insisting that litigants initially address patent
invalidity issues through §§ 102, 103, and 112, instead of “foray[ing] into the
jurisprudential morass of § 101 unless absolutely necessary.”100 The dissenting
opinion explained that it would have reversed the decision and remanded for a
determination of validity under § 103 of the Patent Act.101

III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit affirmed an order granting summary judgment of patent invalidity
by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.102
Writing for the court, Judge Plager affirmed the grant of summary judgment of
invalidity of the patents-in-suit, noting that the district court correctly decided the
case under §§ 102 and 103 of the Patent Act, as opposed to under § 101 as urged by
the dissent.103 The court then held that “database” included both hierarchal and
relational systems and the grant of summary judgment for MySpace was proper.104
The court first discussed the importance of correctly defining “database.”105 To
do so, the court analyzed the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim
language in the written description of the invention found in the patent.106
Specifically, the court explained that an analysis of the language in the “Summary of
the Invention,”107 “Background of the invention,”108 and “Detailed Description of

99. Id. at 1334-35. Once the court found the patents-in-suit ineligible under § 101, it did not conduct a §§
102 or 103 analysis. Id. at 1335.
100. Id. at 1335 (Plager, J., dissenting). This was the same approach used by the court in MySpace.
MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
101. Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1335.
102. 672 F.3d at 1250.
103. Id. at 1262.
104. Id. at 1257.
105. Id. at 1255. The Court noted that if “database” was defined to cover both hierarchical and relational
systems, then the MBB would invalidate all the patents-in-suit as either anticipated under § 102 or obvious
under § 103. Id. However, if “database” was defined to cover only relational systems, summary judgment
would be inappropriate because there would be a genuine issue of disputed fact regarding the question of
invalidity. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1256.
108. Id.
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the Preferred Embodiments”109 sections, indicated that “database” should not be
limited to just relational systems, but should be broadly defined to also encompass
other types of databases.110 The court thus agreed that the district court’s claim
construction of “database” was correct, as it was both reasonable and supported by
context.111
Next, the court rejected GraphOn’s argument that the district court erred in its
conclusion that all the claims were either invalid as anticipated under § 102 or
obvious under § 103.112 The court pointed out that a complete analysis of the claim
language should generally be undertaken.113 However, the court explained that in
this case, the analysis was not a prerequisite of granting summary judgment because
all the claims share a common term that lies at the heart of the invention—the term
“database.”114 Therefore, the district court’s construction of “database” sufficiently
supported its conclusion that there was no triable issue of fact regarding whether
the MBB was a database as used in the patents-in-suit, despite not having engaged
in a § 101 analysis.115 Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion
that the patents-in-suit were inappropriate as they were anticipated or obvious.116
The majority of the court strongly disagreed with the dissent’s reasoning that §
101 should have been addressed before §§ 102 and 103.117 Although the court
acknowledged that some judicial dicta supported the dissent’s position,118 it
highlighted the ambiguity of §101119 as it argued for judicial restraint as a means of
avoiding “the murky morass that is § 101 jurisprudence.”120 The court noted that
the problem with addressing § 101 initially in patent cases is that precedent is
extremely unclear as to what is or is not patentable subject matter, particularly in
regards to abstractness.121 This lack of standards, the court explained, has led to a
lot of uncertainty regarding what is or is not patentable subject matter.122
109.

Id. at 1256–57.
Id.
111. Id. at 1257.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1257–58.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 1258.
117. Id. at 1258–62.
118. Id. at 1258.
119. Id. at 1259. The Court noted that judges continue to vigorously disagree over what is or what is not
patentable subject matter under § 101. Id.
120. Id. at 1260.
121. Id. at 1259. The Court has established that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are
not patentable subject matter. Id. at 1258. Over the years, some standards that provide workable guidelines
have emerged for laws of nature and physical phenomena. Id. at 1259. However, courts have had trouble
interpreting what abstract ideas encompasses. Id. Part of the reason for this confusion is that “abstract ideas”
lacks a concrete definition because courts have declined to define “abstract” beyond the recognition that this is a
110.
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Rather than taking this messy path to the same result, as urged by the dissent, the
court argued that § 101 can be avoided by litigants addressing patent invalidity
issues through §§ 102, 103, and 112.123 The court noted that this is more practical
because, unlike § 101 jurisprudence, these criteria are “well developed and generally
well understood,”124 and it is a waste of time to “[reach] for interpretations of broad
provisions, such as § 101, when more specific statutes, such as §§ 102, 103, and 112,
can decide the case.”125 Lastly, the court noted that this approach would preclude §
101 from becoming a toss-in for every patent infringement suit.126 Therefore, the
court defended its avoidance of § 101 in favor of §§ 102 and 103, and “decline[d]
the dissent’s invitation to put the parties . . . in the swamp that is § 101
jurisprudence.”127
In dissent, Judge Mayer fervently argued that the court mistakenly failed to
address the subject matter eligibility requirements contained in § 101 before
addressing the §§ 102 and 103 issues of anticipation and obviousness.128 The dissent
pointed to both Federal Circuit and Supreme Court precedent establishing the
proposition that the § 101 subject matter eligibility requirement is an “antecedent
question” that must be addressed first.129 The dissent explained that the court
should have used a “robust application of section 101”130 to conclude that the
patents-in-suit did not meet § 101’s subject matter eligibility requirements as
required by precedent. While the dissent agreed that the patents-in-suit were
invalid, it arrived at this conclusion through a different jurisprudential path.131
Although Judge Mayer argued that § 101 should have been addressed first, he
rejected the contention that § 101 should function as a “coarse eligibility filter”
while other patent validity requirements such as §§ 102, 103, or 112 should be used
to weed out patents of dubious quality.132 In calling that approach a “misplaced
reliance on sections 102, 103, or 112,” the dissent affirmed § 101’s importance by
disqualifying characteristic. As the internet and computer culture has grown, the confusion as to what is an
“abstract idea” has exponentially increased. Id.
122. Id. at 1259. The Court compares judges interpreting § 101 with an oenologist trying to describe a new
wine, where picking adjectives to describe the wine depends less “on the assumed content of the words than on
the taste of the tongue pronouncing them.” Id.
123. Id. at 1260.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1261. The court noted that if this were done in every patent case, it would be unnecessary to
address § 101 because the validity of patents could simply be concluded under §§ 102, 103, and 112. Id. at 1260.
126. Id. at 1261.
127. Id. at 1262.
128. Id. at 1264 (Mayer, J., dissenting). Specifically, the issue of whether GraphOn’s patents were an
unpatentable “abstract idea.” Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1269.
131. Id. at 1265.
132. Id. at 1268.
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emphasizing that all claims must meet those requirements in order to address
“[c]oncerns about attempts to call any form of human activity a ‘process.’”133
Lastly, the dissent explained that § 101 was designed to strike a balance between
“protecting inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures that others
would discover by independent, creative application of general principles.”134
Therefore, the dissent reasoned that addressing § 101 at the onset is required to
ensure that the patent laws perform their designed function.135

IV. ANALYSIS
In MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., the United States Federal Circuit affirmed an
order granting summary judgment of patent invalidity of four patents-in-suit.136
The MySpace court incorrectly ignored decades of contrary precedent from the
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit137 when it consciously decided to forego the §
101 subject matter eligibility analysis before addressing §§ 102, 103, and 112.138
Conversely, the dissent correctly argued that the court should have addressed the §
101 issue at the beginning of the invalidity analysis.139 Because Federal Circuit
decisions are binding,140 the MySpace decision is going to further complicate the
already immensely unclear and “murky morass” that is § 101 jurisprudence.141 As a
result of contradicting precedent and a lack of clear standards, judges faced with the
confusing task of determining patent validity will likely use their own discretion,
which may result in many conflicting opinions. Therefore, the surprisingly
unresolved issue of whether § 101 is an “antecedent question” may not have a
definitive answer until the Supreme Court once again explicitly says so.

A) The Dissent Correctly Argued that the Court Mistakenly Ignored Precedent when it
Intentionally Bypassed the Preliminary § 101 Analysis and Went Straight to §§ 102
and 103
The MySpace dissent correctly argued that the court ignored precedent when it
purposefully side-stepped the § 101 subject matter eligibility issue and went straight
133.

Id.
Id. at 1269 (citing Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228).
135. Id. at 1269–70 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981)).
136. Id. at 1264 (majority opinion).
137. See e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998) abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
138. Id. at 1260.
139. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1264 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
140. See discussion supra Part II.A.
141. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1260 (majority opinion).
134.
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to a §§ 102 and 103 analysis.142 Although the court avoided § 101 because of its lack
of clarity, this decision undermines over three decades of binding precedent and
does not bring any clarity to the issue of patent validity.143 The Supreme Court144
and Federal Circuit145 have repeatedly affirmed and reaffirmed the notion that an
invention cannot be patented if it does not initially meet the § 101 requirements in
addition to the other Patent Act requirements; therefore, the MySpace court’s
exercise of “judicial restraint” 146 was misplaced.
Although there is no shortage of opinions stating that § 101 must be analyzed
before §§ 102 and 103, the language in Bilski and Comiskey provides necessary
clarity to the issue.147 In calling the § 101 subject matter eligibility inquiry a
“threshold test,” Bilski very explicitly stated that § 101 should be addressed at the
onset of litigation regarding patent invalidity.148 Similarly, Comiskey clearly
indicated that whether an invention meets the § 101 subject eligibility requirements
is an “antecedent question” that must always be addressed before any other section
of the Patent Act can be analyzed.149 In acknowledging, yet ignoring the precedent
set in Bilski and Comiskey, as well as many other preceding cases, the MySpace court
incorrectly exercised judicial restraint to bypass the § 101 analysis. As much of a
“murky morass” as § 101 jurisprudence is,150 the MySpace court’s recommendation
to ignore the § 101 analysis disregarded precedent.
In ignoring the preliminary § 101 analysis, the MySpace court adopted the
approach set forth in the Dealertrack dissent earlier in 2012,151 where the dissent
argued that courts should exercise their judicial authority by avoiding § 101 unless
absolutely necessary.152 Interestingly, the author of the dissent in Dealertrack was
the same author of the MySpace opinion—Judge Plager.153 Judge Plager’s position is
more apparent in MySpace as he was the author of the majority opinion, as opposed

142.

MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1264, 1268 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
See discussion supra Part II.C–D.
144. See discussion supra Part II.C.
145. See discussion supra Part II.D.
146. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1258 (majority opinion) (urging “judicial restraint in the face of what has become
a plethora of opinions adding to [ ] § 101 jurisprudence”).
147. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (holding that the § 101 issue is a threshold inquiry); In re
Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that whether an invention meets the § 101 requirements
is an “antecedent question”).
148. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.
149. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 975.
150. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1260.
151. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Plager, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. Id; see also MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1253 (exhibiting Judge Plager’s ideological switch from the dissent in
Dealertrack to the majority in MySpace).
143.
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to the dissent in Dealertrack.154 Procedurally, the MySpace court was able to avoid
analyzing § 101 because it was not the issue being appealed.155 However, under the
precedent set by the Dealertrack court, it seems necessary for the court to consider §
101 first.156
B) The Contrary Precedent Set By MySpace Further Complicates An Already Unclear
and Convoluted Area of Law
In determining that §§ 102 and 103 should be analyzed before § 101 as a means
of better facilitating patent invalidity analyses,157 the MySpace court further
complicated an already messy area of the law.158 As discussed above, although most
inventions would normally fall under § 101’s purview, the judicial exceptions of
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas restrict the reach of § 101.
Although there is case law clarifying and providing guidelines for analyzing laws of
nature and physical phenomena, the meaning of abstract ideas and what it may
encompass remains ambiguous. Indeed, abstractness presents a different set of
interpretive problems than laws or nature and physical phenomena, as almost
anything can be construed to be an abstract idea.159
In response, courts have cautioned that while the core of a claim can often be
characterized as an abstract idea, courts should not “go hunting for abstractions by
ignoring the concrete, palpable, tangible, and otherwise not abstract invention the

154. Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1335 (Plager, J., dissenting). In the Dealertrack dissent, Judge Plager argued
that §101 should have been bypassed in favor of §§ 102 and 103. Id. In his majority opinion in MySpace, he
affirmed this idea by emphasizing the importance of avoiding § 101 in favor of other sections of the Patent Act.
MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1253.
155. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1250; see also See Brian Wallenfelt, Avoiding the “Judicial Morass” of Section 101 in
MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., PATENTS4SOFTWARE, http://www.patents4software.com/2012/03/avoidingthe-”judicial-morass”-of-section-101-in-myspace-inc-v-graphon-corp/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
156. But see CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. 685 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Decided after
MySpace, the court in CLS Bank emphasized the different function of § 101 from the other sections of the
Patent Act, notably §§§ 102, 103, and 112. The Federal Circuit ultimately held that § 101 issues do not always
need to be addressed first, particularly when other sections could resolve a dispute more expeditiously or with
more clarity and predictability. Id. The court also noted that §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112 all serve a different
purpose and play distinctly different roles. Id. The Federal Circuit’s holding in CLS Bank is problematic as it
affirms the MySpace court’s conscious decision to bypass the § 101 analysis. As discussed below, this new
conflicting precedent will result in even more future conflicting precedent, as judges will have the option of
supporting a decision to use § 101 or a decision to bypass it with precedent.
157. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1260.
158. See Matthew DeIulio, Courts Left with Little Guidance Following the Supreme Court’s Decision in Bilski v.
Kappos, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 285, 292-93 (2010) (discussing the uncertainty faced by courts
regarding the proper test to apply in determining the patentability of various subject matters).
159. See supra note 57.

122

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Fishelman (Do Not Delete)

1/28/2014 2:09 PM

Emmanuel A. Fishelman
patentee actually claims.”160 Additionally, the Federal Circuit has struggled in
attempting to develop a rigid standard for what is an unpatentable abstract idea
under § 101. Despite the difficulties of conducting a § 101 analysis, such an analysis
must take place, as § 101’s inclusion in the Patent Act161 indicates that Congress
intended for its inclusion in any subsequent analysis of patent invalidity. Had
Congress intended otherwise, it seems logical to assume that they would not have
included § 101 in the Patent Act.
Prior to MySpace, case law did not offer any apparent standards or guidelines
regarding what “abstract ideas” were or how to screen them.162 Despite this, courts
generally seemed to understand that precedent required the messy § 101 analysis to
always be addressed first.163 In light of MySpace, courts will now not only be unclear
about how to conduct the § 101 analysis, but there will also be contradicting
decisions regarding whether such an analysis is even necessary. Lacking guidelines,
judges will be afforded a plethora of discretion in determining whether or not to
address § 101. This discretion will result in a case-by-case analysis for patentable
subject matter eligibility requirements, as an individual best judgment standard will
be all judges have to rely on when issuing patents to prospective claimants.164
Judges employing an individual best judgment standard are problematic, as it
will result in a wide array of decisions and reasoning, which will in turn create
administrative obstacles in the future because, quite simply, different judges have
different tastes.165 This will have a drastic effect on the entire patent system, as
different judges will employ different standards in determining whether patents are
invalid—namely, many judges may decline to analyze § 101 even when a patent
cannot be invalidated under §§ 102 or 103. For example, where one judge may find
a patent invalid after noting that it does not meet the requirements of § 101,
another judge may skip the § 101 analysis and find that same patent valid. This

160. The Federal Circuit addresses the abstract idea exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101, LEXOLOGY,
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1f97db5c-906c-4cfb-9df4-875172f881c0 (Aug 27, 2012) (citing
CLS Bank, 685 F.3d at 1351).
161. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
162. See Menell, supra note 74, at 1313-14 (emphasizing the “lack of a forthright, principled framework for
delineating the boundaries of patentable subject matter”); see also DeIulio, supra note 162, at 293 (noting that
the Supreme Court has blurred section § 101’s application and scope as a result of refusing to establish any
particular rules for patent eligibility).
163. See discussion supra Part II.C–D.
164. See Mills, supra note 88, at 391 (stressing that a “discretionary patentable subject matter standard
implies that the analysis should be conducted on a “case-by-case basis” and thus leaves the determination
“within the reviewing body’s sole discretion”); cf., J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and
Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2519 (1994) (asserting that an empirically based approach is
needed to stabilize our unstable intellectual property system).
165. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (comparing judges applications
of § 101 with oenologists trying to describe a new wine, where an adjective to describe the wine “depends less on
the assumed content of the words than on the taste of the tongue pronouncing them”).
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would strongly undermine the patent system as the composition of the judges
analyzing the claim would play as significant a role as the claim’s merits in
determining patent eligibility. Therefore, the MySpace decision negatively
contributes to the already unclear universe of § 101 jurisprudence.166
C) The Supreme Court Will Eventually Need to Readdress the Issue of Whether § 101 is
a Preliminary Question in Order to Clarify the Confusion
In 2010, Bilski definitively established that the § 101 issue is a “threshold test”
that must be addressed before §§ 102 and 103 issues.167 Although how to apply the
§ 101 analysis is unclear, the necessity of analyzing § 101 first is clear. However, just
two years after Bilski’s guidance, the MySpace opinion contributed confusion to the
unclear realm of § 101.168 In light of MySpace, courts faced with determining
whether a patent is invalid will not only lack clear guidelines regarding how to
conduct the § 101 inquiry,169 but will also be conflicted regarding whether the § 101
subject matter eligibility requirements should be addressed at the onset of the
analysis. In MySpace, the court was able to easily avoid the question of whether to
use § 101 at all in the case because it was not the issue under appeal.170 However,
there will certainly be future cases where the § 101 issue cannot be avoided as
easily.171 This will undeniably result in more mixed and conflicting opinions as the
determination of whether a patent is invalid may very well fall on whether the
sitting judge decides to employ the § 101 analysis first.
To rectify the confusion created by MySpace, the Supreme Court will need to
once again declare whether § 101 issues must be addressed before other sections of
the Patent Act can be analyzed. If the Supreme Court understates MySpace and
reaffirms decades of § 101 jurisprudence, § 101 will unquestioningly need to be
addressed at the beginning of patent litigation. Additionally, the Supreme Court
should provide long-overdue guidance regarding the meaning of “abstract ideas,”
what it encompasses, and how courts should conduct an abstract ideas § 101
analysis. This is important as it would bring much-needed clarity to this area of
law. However, if the Supreme Court agrees with MySpace and determines that

166.

Id. at 1260.
See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
168. See DeIulio, supra note 162, at 292–93 (discussing the uncertainty faced by courts regarding the proper
test to apply in determining the patentability of various subject matters).
169. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
170. See Brian Wallenfelt, Avoiding the “Judicial Morass” of Section 101 in MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp.,
PATENTS4SOFTWARE,
http://www.patents4software.com/2012/03/avoiding-the-”judicial-morass”-of-section101-in-myspace-inc-v-graphon-corp/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
171. Id. (noting that under Dealertrack, the court would consider the section 101 issue if a party is seeking
summary judgment under section 101 to avoid the time and expense of trial, however, it is unclear if the
MySpace decision will change this).
167.
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courts would be better off avoiding messy § 101 jurisprudence in favor of clearer
sections of the Patent Act,172 then § 101’s importance and use will be greatly
diminished. Regardless of which approach the Supreme Court takes, the decision
of the MySpace court illustrates the importance of an end-all-be-all Supreme Court
decision regarding whether or not § 101 must be addressed at the beginning of a
patent invalidity analysis.173

V. CONCLUSION
In MySpace v. GraphOn, the United States Federal Circuit held that judges could
exercise their judicial authority to bypass the § 101 subject matter eligibility
requirement issue in favor of other sections of the Patent Act, such as §§ 102 and
103.174 The court incorrectly ignored a plethora of Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit precedent which states that § 101 is a “threshold test” and an “antecedent
question.”175 This seemingly contradictory precedent set by MySpace will further
complicate the already “murky morass” that is § 101 jurisprudence.176 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court will eventually need to, once again, rule on whether § 101 is a
preliminary question or if judges can avoid the confusion associated with its
application by ignoring § 101 altogether.177 In conclusion, it really is as simple as
counting—101 comes before 102 and 103.

172.

MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1260.
Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 347, 357 (2012) (noting that, as a result of a lack of guidance for the
Federal Circuit, the stage has been set for an appeal of another § 101 case).
174. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
175. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
176. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
177. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
173.
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